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Abstract
We present parallel characterizations of two diﬀerent values in the framework of
restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a ﬁnite sequence
of partitions deﬁned on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous
one, hence forming a structure of diﬀerent levels of a priori unions. On the one
hand, we consider a value ﬁrst introduced in , 8), which extends the Shapley value
to games with diﬀerent levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce
another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in
the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable
properties.
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1 Introduction
Transferable utility cooperative games (just games from now on) are used to describe
situations in which agents cooperate to obtain some gains, e.g. building a road to connect
a number of towns or reaching an agreement to pass a bill. These gains are assumed to
be divisible and transferable among players without any loss. Assessing the strength of
each player in a given game is a main objective of cooperative game theory. The Shapley
value , 5) is the best known concept in this respect. Weighted majority games constitute
an important subclass of games and are mainly used to study the distribution of power
in voting bodies. The Banzhaf index was proposed as a measure of power in such an
environment , 4) and later on extended to the class of all games by , 1).
In the original model there is no restriction to the cooperation, and the game is
deﬁned by the worth that any coalition can obtain by its own. However, there are many
real situations in which there is a priori information about the behavior of the players
or there are environmental restrictions and only partial cooperation occurs. Diﬀerent
approaches have been used to address this type of situations and diﬀerent models of
games with restricted cooperation have been studied. In particular, players may form
coalitions and these coalitions may bargain for the division of the worth of the grand
coalition. supposes that the restrictions to the cooperation are given by a partition of
the set of players. The model with both a game and a partition of the set of players is
called a game with a priori unions. For these games, , 2) proposes and characterizes the
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Owen value, an extension of the Shapley value , 5) to allocate the gains generated by
the grand coalition. Following a similar procedure, in a subsequent paper , 3) deﬁnes
an extension of the Banzhaf value , 1) known as the Banzhaf-Owen value. The ﬁrst
characterization of this solution concept is presented in . give parallel characterizations
of the two aforementioned values which eases the comparison between them.
, 8) takes one step beyond by introducing games with many levels of cooperation,
which extends the model of games with a priori unions. He proposes and characterizes
an extension of the Owen value for this kind of situations, which we will call the Shapley
levels value. As before, players are assumed to be organized in groups to bargain for the
division of the worth available (ﬁrst level of cooperation). Nevertheless, this time the
formed unions may again organize themselves in larger groups (second level of cooper-
ation) while they maintain their internal obligations of the ﬁrst level, and so on and so
forth. Hence, this time the restrictions to the cooperation are described by a sequence of
partitions of the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous ones. gives an
alternative characterization of the Shapley levels value using a balanced contributions
property and , 7) implements the Shapley levels value in a subgame perfect equilibrium
of a particular bidding mechanism.
In the present paper, we ﬁrst propose an extension of the Banzhaf-Owen value for
games with levels structure of cooperation, which we call the Banzhaf levels value. Levels
structures are very reasonable in many voting situations, and hence it seams reasonable
to study the extension of the Banzhaf value to a levels structure framework. For the
sake of generality, the new value is introduced for the class of all games.
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Then, we provide parallel characterizations of both the Shapley levels value and the
Banzhaf levels value which reveal diﬀerences between both solution concepts. Parallel
characterizations of two diﬀerent values are specially appealing for at least two reasons.
In the ﬁrst place, from a mathematically point of view, characterizing one value using a
few independent properties may be more appealing than just giving an explicit formula
or procedure to calculate it. In the second place, deciding on whether to use a value
or another can be made more easily using a set of comparable properties instead of a
formula.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is mainly devoted to present
the model of games with levels structure of cooperation, and in particular the Shapley
levels value introduced by , 8). In Section 3 we deﬁne the Banzhaf levels value. In
Section 4 we introduce and explain some properties that a value for games with levels
structure of cooperation might satisfy, and we provide a characterization for each of the
two aforementioned values. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
An n-person cooperative game with transferable utility (a game) is a pair (N, v), where
N = {1, . . . , n} is the ﬁnite set of players and v, the characteristic function, is a real
valued function on 2N = {S : S ⊆ N} with v(∅) = 0. We denote by G the set of all
games. For each S ⊆ N and i ∈ N we will write S ∪ i instead S ∪ {i} and S \ i instead
S \ {i}.
Given (N, v) ∈ G, a player i ∈ N is a dummy if v(S∪i) = v(S)+v(i) for all S ⊆ N \i,
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that is, if all her marginal contributions, v(S ∪ i)− v(S), are equal to v(i). Two players
i, j ∈ N are symmetric if v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j) for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, that is, if their
marginal contributions to each coalition coincide.
A value on G is a map f that assigns to every game (N, v) ∈ G a vector f(N, v) ∈ Rn.
The following deﬁnitions provide the explicit expressions of two well-known values in
the literature. Throughout the paper, for each ﬁnite set given by a capital letter, the
corresponding lowercase letter stands for the cardinality of the set. Also, if needed, we
use the | · | operator to denote the cardinality of a set.
Deﬁnition 2.1. , 5) Given a game (N, v), the Shapley value, φ, is a vector in Rn where
each coordinate is deﬁned as follows:
φi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] , for every i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 2.2. , 1) Given a game (N, v), the Banzhaf value, ψ, is a vector in Rn where
each coordinate is deﬁned as follows:
ψi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
1
2n−1
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] , for every i ∈ N.
We denote by P(N) the set of all partitions of a ﬁnite set of players N , and for
each P ∈ P(N) and each S ⊆ N , P|S ∈ P(S) is the partition of S induced by P , i.e.,
P|S = {U ∩ S : U ∈ P,U ∩ S 6= ∅}. A levels structure of cooperation is a pair (N,B),
where N is the set of players and B = {B0, . . . , Bk} is a sequence of partitions of N
such that B0 = {{i} : i ∈ N} and, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}, Br+1 is coarser than Br.
That is to say, for each r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} and each S ∈ Br+1, there is B ⊆ Br such
that S = ∪U∈BU . Each U ∈ Br is called a union and Br is called the r-th level of B.
5
We denote by L(N) the set of all levels structures of cooperation over the set N . The
following example illustrates the above deﬁnitions.
Example 2.3. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and B = {B0, B1, B2} be a levels structure of
cooperation over N with two levels, where
B2 = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}},
B1 = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}, {5, 6}}, and
B0 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}}.
A cooperative game with levels structure of cooperation is a triple (N, v,B), where
(N, v) ∈ G and (N,B) ∈ L(N). We denote by GL the set of all cooperative games
with levels structure of cooperation. Given (N,B) ∈ L(N) with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}
and i ∈ N , we denote by (N,B−i) ∈ L(N) the levels structure of cooperation obtained
from (N,B) by isolating player i from the union she belongs to at each level, i.e., B−i =
{B−i0 , . . . , B−ik }, where, for all r ∈ {0, . . . , k}, B−ir = {U ∈ Br : i /∈ U}∪{Ur\i, {i}} given
that i ∈ Ur ∈ Br. Note that B−i0 = B0. For each r ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each U ∈ Br, [U ]
denotes U considered as a single player at level r, whereas [Br] denotes the set of players
at level r, i.e, [Br] = {[U ] : U ∈ Br} and ([Br], Br) ∈ L([Br]), where Br = {Br, . . . , Bk}.
Given (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k} we deﬁne the r-th
level game ([Br], v
r, Br) ∈ GL as the game with levels structure of cooperation induced
from (N, v,B) by considering the coalitions of Br as players, i.e., for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k},
vr(∪tl=1[Ul]) = v(∪tl=1Ul) with U1, . . . , Ut ∈ Br for some t ≥ 0.
In the framework of games with levels structure of cooperation we assume that
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players are initially organized into the coalition structure Bk as groups that bargain for
the division of v(N). Then, each union of the last level is divided again according to the
coalition structure Bk−1 in order to divide the amount that the unions of the last level
have obtained, and so on and so forth until the last level, B0, is reached.
A value on GL is a map f that assigns to every game with levels structure of co-
operation (N, v,B) ∈ GL a vector f(N, v,B) ∈ Rn. We denote by Π(N) the set of
permutations of N , i.e., the set of bijective mappings from N to N .
Next, given a levels structure of cooperation (N,B) ∈ L(N) with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}
let the sets Ω(B) = Ω1(B) ⊆ Ω2(B) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Ωk(B) ⊆ Π(N) be deﬁned as follows. First
of all,
Ωk(B) = {σ ∈ Π(N) : ∀S ∈ Bk, ∀i, j ∈ S ∈ Bk and l ∈ N, if σ(i) < σ(l) < σ(j) then l ∈ S}.
Then, for r ∈ {k − 1, . . . , 1} we recursively deﬁne
Ωr(B) = {σ ∈ Ωr+1(B) : ∀i, j ∈ S ∈ Br and l ∈ N, if σ(i) < σ(l) < σ(j) then l ∈ S}.
Observe that Ωr(B) denotes the permutations of Ωr+1(B) such that the elements
of each union of Br are consecutive. Let us see an example to illustrate the above
deﬁnitions.
Example 2.4. For the levels structure of cooperation of Example 2.3, |Ω2(B)| = 72,
|Ω1(B)| = 32, (1, 2, 4, 3, 5, 6) /∈ Ω2(B), (1, 3, 2, 4, 5, 6) ∈ Ω2(B)\Ω1(B) and (3, 2, 1, 5, 6, 4) ∈
Ω1(B).
Now we are in the position to recall the deﬁnition of the already known solution
concept for games with levels structure of cooperation.
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Deﬁnition 2.5. Given a game with levels structure of cooperation (N, v,B) ∈ GL, the
Shapley levels value , 8), Φ, is a vector in Rn where each coordinate is deﬁned as follows:
Φi(N, v,B) =
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω(B)
(v(P σi ∪ i)− v(P σi )),
where P σi = {j ∈ N : σ(j) < σ(i)} is the set of predecessors of i at σ.
, 8) proves that the Shapley levels value is the unique value on GL satisfying eﬃ-
ciency, additivity, anonymity1, the null player property and coalitional symmetry. The
ﬁrst four properties are extensions of standard properties in the literature, whereas coali-
tional symmetry demands that the sum of the payoﬀs to the players belonging to two
unions S and U of some level r be the same whenever [S] and [U ] are symmetric players
in the r-th level game and they belong to the same union in the next level. It is worthy
to mention that the ﬁve properties are natural extensions of the properties used in , 2)
to characterize the Owen value, which is simply the restriction of Φ to games with levels
structure of cooperation with a single level.
3 A new value on GL
In this section we introduce a new value on GL that coincides with the Banzhaf-Owen
value , 3) when the levels structure of cooperation has just one level, i.e., when B =
{B0, B1}. The idea for deﬁning this new value is to induce, for each player, a partition
of the set of players that respects the restrictions of the levels structure of cooperation.
In other words, instead of looking at which permutations are feasible for the given levels
1In , 8) it is denoted by individual symmetry.
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structure, as in , 8), for each player we look at which coalitions are feasible for the given
levels structure of cooperation.
Given a levels structure of cooperation (N,B) ∈ L(N), for each player i ∈ N , let
i ∈ U0 = {i} ⊆ U1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Uk such that Ur ∈ Br for all r ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Then, the
partition induced by B on i is deﬁned as follows,
P (i, B) =
k⋃
r=0
(Br)|Ur+1\Ur ,
where Uk+1 = N by convenience. Then, P (i, B) ∈ P(N \ i). We denote |P (i, B)| by mi,
and the unions of the partition induced by B on i, by P (i, B) = {T1, . . . , Tmi}. Finally
the set of indices of the partition induced by B on i is denoted by Mi = {1, . . . ,mi}
which can be seen as the set of representatives of the unions of P (i, B).
Example 3.1. For the levels structure of cooperation of Example 2.3 we have, for instance,
P (1, B) = {{2}, {3}, {4, 5, 6}} and P (3, B) = {{1, 2}, {4, 5, 6}}.
Using the partition induced by the levels structure for each player, we deﬁne a new
value on GL, namely the Banzhaf levels value, which is built based on the Banzhaf-Owen
value for games with a priori unions.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Given a cooperative game with levels structure of cooperation (N, v,B) ∈
GL, the Banzhaf levels value, Ψ, is a value on GL deﬁned, for every i ∈ N , as follows:
Ψi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
1
2mi
[v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)] ,
where TR = ∪r∈RTr.
One can easily check that the coalitions considered in each marginal contribution,
TR, are the coalitions for which there exists σ ∈ Ω(B) such that TR = P σi . There-
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fore, exploiting the link between coalitions of elements of P (i, B), for each i ∈ N , and
permutations of Ω(B) the Shapley levels value, Φ, can be written in an alternative way.
Remark 3.3. Given a cooperative game with levels structure of cooperation (N, v,B) ∈
GL,
Φi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
ciR
|Ω(B)| [v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)] ,
where ciR = |{σ ∈ Ω(B) : P σi = TR}|.
Expressions of Φ and Ψ above lead to the Owen , 2) and Banzhaf-Owen , 3) values
respectively for levels structure of cooperation with a single level.
4 Two parallel axiomatic characterizations
In this section we characterize both Φ and Ψ based on two diﬀerent groups of properties.
The ﬁrst group applies only to games with the trivial levels structure B = {B0} =
{{i} : i ∈ N} and points out which value on G does the value on GL generalize, either
the Shapley value or the Banzhaf value. The second group of properties describes the
performance of the values in GL with respect to the levels structure and they are logically
related.
We consider a number of properties that a value on GL, f , might be asked to satisfy.
We start with a ﬁrst set of properties.
eff A value f on GL satisﬁes eﬃciency if for every (N, v) ∈ G,
∑
i∈N
fi(N, v, {B0}) = v(N).
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2-eff A value f on GL satisﬁes 2-eﬃciency if for every (N, v) ∈ G and any i, j ∈ N ,
fi(N, v, {B0}) + fj(N, v, {B0}) = fp(N ij , vij , {B0}ij),
where (N ij , vij , {B0}ij) is the game with levels structure of cooperation such that
player i and j have merged into the new player p /∈ N , i.e., N ij = (N \ {i, j})∪ p,
{B0}ij = {{l} : l ∈ N ij}, and
vij(S) =

v(S) if p /∈ S
v((S \ p) ∪ i ∪ j) if p ∈ S
for every S ⊆ N ij .
dpp A value f on GL satisﬁes the dummy player property if for every (N, v) ∈ G, if
i ∈ N is a dummy player on (N, v),
fi(N, v, {B0}) = v(i).
sym A value f on GL satisﬁes symmetry if for every (N, v) ∈ G, if i, j ∈ N are symmetric
players in (N, v),
fi(N, v, {B0}) = fj(N, v, {B0}).
emc A value f on GL satisﬁes equal marginal contributions if for every (N, v), (N,w) ∈
G and every i ∈ N such that v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = w(S ∪ i)− w(S) for all S ⊆ N \ i,
fi(N, v, {B0}) = fi(N,w, {B0}).
The above properties are standard in the literature for games without restricted
cooperation. The eff property states that the whole worth available is shared among
the players. The 2-eff property is a collusion neutrality property which states that the
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payoﬀ of two players does not change if they decide to artiﬁcially merge in a new player.
Properties of this kind are used in many characterizations of the Banzhaf value, see for
instance , or , 0). The sym and dpp properties are clear by themselves. The property
of emc states that if a player's marginal contributions to any coalition in two games
coincide, then her payoﬀs also coincide in the case of the trivial levels structure. Stronger
versions of emc have been used in characterizations of both Shapley and Banzhaf values
and they are called monotonicity , 9).
In Theorem 4.1 (resp. Theorem 4.2) we use, together with other properties that are
presented below, eff, sym and emc to characterize the Shapley levels value Φ (resp.
2-eff, dpp, sym and emc to characterize the Banzhaf levels value Ψ). Although all
these properties are presented in a weak form, in the sense that they only concern the
trivial levels structure, it can be checked that both Φ and Ψ satisfy stronger versions of
the corresponding properties. These latter strong versions are stated in the same manner
as their weak counterparts but they concern any levels structure, either trivial or not,
with the condition that whenever two players are involved they are asked to belong to
the same union at each level.
Let us now consider another set of properties.
lgp A value f on GL satisﬁes the level game property if for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL with
B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and every U ∈ Br with r ∈ {1, · · · , k},
∑
i∈U
fi(N, v,B) = f[U ]([Br], v
r, Br).
slgp A value f on GL satisﬁes the singleton level game property if for every (N, v,B) ∈
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GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and every U ∈ Br with r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, such that
U = {i} for some i ∈ N ,
fi(N, v,B) = f[U ]([Br], v
r, Br).
lbc A value f on GL satisﬁes level balanced contributions if for every (N, v,B) ∈ GL
with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and i, j ∈ U ∈ B1,
fi(N, v,B)− fi(N, v,B−j) = fj(N, v,B)− fj(N, v,B−i).
lnid A value f on GL satisﬁes level neutrality under individual desertion if for every
(N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and i, j ∈ U ∈ B1,
fi(N, v,B) = fi(N, v,B
−j).
The lgp is based on a property used in , 2) to characterize the Owen value. It states
that the total payoﬀ obtained by the members of a union in a given level equals the payoﬀ
obtained by the union when considering it as a player in the corresponding level game.
The slgp is a weaker version of lgp, which states that any union which is composed of
a single player gets the same payoﬀ in the original game and in the corresponding level
game when considering the union as a player. The idea behind slgp is also used in and
more recently in .
The lbc property is a reciprocity property that states that the isolation of a player
from the levels structure aﬀects the players in her same union of the ﬁrst level in the
same amount as if it happens the other way around. This property has been used in the
context of games with a priori unions, e.g. , 6) and . The lnid property is a stronger
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version of lbc and states that the isolation of a player from the levels structure does
not aﬀect the payoﬀs of the players which are in her same union in all the levels. lnid
is introduced in and also used in to characterize extensions of the Banzhaf value to
diﬀerent classes of games.
Next we state and prove the two characterization results, one for the Shapley levels
value (Theorem 4.1) and one for the Banzhaf levels value (Theorem 4.2). We start
characterizing the Shapley levels value.
Theorem 4.1. The Shapley levels value, Φ, is the unique value on GL satisfying eff,
sym, emc, lgp, and lbc.
Proof. First we show that Φ satisﬁes the properties and then we prove that it is
the only value on GL satisfying them.
(1) Existence. Note that, by deﬁnition, for every (N, v) ∈ G, Φ(N, v, {B0}) =
φ(N, v). Hence, from , 9) we have that Φ satisﬁes eff, sym, and emc.
In the case of lgp, let (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, and consider some
U ⊆ N such that U ∈ Br with r ∈ {1, · · · , k}. We prove that Φ satisﬁes lgp by
induction over r. If r = 1, from the deﬁnition of the induced partition, P (i, B) \
{{j} : j ∈ U \ i} is the same partition for each i ∈ U . Moreover, for any i ∈ U it holds
that P ([U ], B1) = P (i, B) \ {{j} : j ∈ U \ i}. For each i ∈ U , R ⊆M[U ], and S ⊆ U \ i,
let ciR+S = |{σ ∈ Ω(B) : P σi = TR ∪ S}|. By the way Ω(B) is constructed, given
R ⊆ M[U ] and i ∈ U , ciR+S is the same for any S ⊆ U \ i with a given cardinality
s, and hence it can be denoted by ciR+s. Moreover, c
i
R+s = c
j
R+s for every i, j ∈ U ,
R ⊆M[U ], and S ⊆ U \ i, and thus ciR+s can be further denoted simply by cR+s. Recall
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that c[U ]R = |{σ ∈ Ω(B1) : P σ[U ] = TR}|. Then, by Remark 3.3,
∑
i∈U
Φi(N, v,B)
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
i∈U
∑
R⊆M[U ]
∑
S⊆U\i
cR+s · (v(TR ∪ S ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ S))
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
R⊆M[U ]
∑
i∈U
∑
S⊆U\i
cR+s · (v(TR ∪ S ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ S))
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
R⊆M[U ]
 u · cR+(u−1) · v(TR ∪ U)− u · cR+0 · v(TR)
+
∑
∅6=S(U
[
s · cR+(s−1) − (u− s)cR+s
] · v(TR ∪ S)

=
∑
R⊆M[U ]
[
u · cR+(u−1)|Ω(B)| · v(TR ∪ U) + u ·
cR+0
|Ω(B)| · v(TR)
]
=
1
|Ω(B1)|
∑
R⊆M[U ]
c
[U ]
R ·
[(
v1(TR ∪ [U ])− v1(TR)
)]
= Φ[U ]([B1], v
1, B1),
(1)
where the third equality is obtained by rearranging the terms of the summation, the
fourth equality holds since cR+scR+(s−1) =
s
u−s for all 1 ≤ s ≤ u − 1 and the ﬁfth equality
holds since
cR+(u−1) = cR+0 =
c
[u]
R
u
· Ω(B)
Ω(B1)
,
which completes the ﬁrst step of the induction.
Now suppose that, for some r ∈ {2, ..., k} and for any S ∈ Br−1,
∑
i∈S Φi(N, v,B) =
Φ[S]([Br−1], vr−1, Br−1). Let U ∈ Br. Then
∑
i∈U
Φi(N, v,B) =
∑
S∈Br−1
S⊆U
∑
i∈S
Φi(N, v,B) =
∑
S∈Br−1
S⊆U
Φ[S]([Br−1], vr−1, Br−1)
by the induction hypothesis. We can follow the argument from eq. (1) with
(
[Br−1], vr−1, Br−1
)
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instead of (N, v,B) and [U ] ∈ [Br−1] instead of i ∈ N to obtain
∑
S∈Br−1
S⊆U
Φ[S]([Br−1], vr−1, Br−1) = Φ[U ]([Br], vr, Br),
which completes the induction.
In the case of lbc, let (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and i, j ∈ U ∈ B1.
Then, it is easy to check that P (i, B) \ j = P (j, B) \ i. Hence, we deﬁne P (ij, B) =
P (i, B) \ j = P (j, B) \ i, mij = |P (ij, B)|, and Mij = {1, . . . ,mij}. Then,
Φi(N, v,B)− Φi(N, v,B−j)
=
∑
R⊆Mij
[
ciR+j
|Ω(B)| (v(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ j)) +
ciR
|Ω(B)| (v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR))
]
−
∑
R⊆Mij
[
ci,−jR+j
|Ω(B−j)| (v(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ j)) +
ci,−jR
|Ω(B−j)| (v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR))
]
=
∑
R⊆Mij
[(
ciR+j
|Ω(B)| −
ci,−jR+j
|Ω(B−j)|
)
(v(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− v(TR ∪ j))
+
(
ciR
|Ω(B)| −
ci,−jR
|Ω(B−j)|
)
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR))
]
,
where for each R ⊆Mij , ci,−jR = |{σ ∈ Ω(B−j) : P σi = TR}| and ci,−jR+j = |{σ ∈ Ω(B−j) :
P σi = TR ∪ j}|. Note that, by deﬁnition, ciR = cjR, ciR+j = cjR+i, ci,−jR = cj,−iR , and
ci,−jR+j = c
j,−i
R+i. We additionally claim (see the proof in the Appendix) that
ciR + c
i
R+j
|Ω(B)| =
ci,−jR + c
i,−j
R+j
|Ω(B−j)| . (2)
Then Φi(N, v,B)−Φi(N, v,B−j) depends on i in the same way it depends on j, which
concludes the proof.
(2) Uniqueness. In , 9) it is proved that any value on GL that satisﬁes eff, sym,
and emc is unique for games with the trivial levels structure of cooperation. In other
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words, let f1 and f2 be two values on GL satisfying eff, sym, and emc, then
f1(N, v, {B0}) = f2(N, v, {B0}) = φ(N, v) , for any (N, v) ∈ G.
Hence, let f1 and f2 be two values on GL satisfying lgp and lbc such that f1(N, v, {B0}) =
f2(N, v, {B0}) for all (N, v) ∈ G. We prove that for any (N, v,B) ∈ GL, with B =
{B0, . . . , Bk}, f1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) by induction on the number k of levels of B.
The case k = 1 is proved in , 6). Now suppose that f1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) for any
(N, v,B) ∈ GL such that |B| ≤ k and let (N, v,B) ∈ GL with |B| = k + 1. Let also
i ∈ N . We prove that f1i (N, v,B) = f2i (N, v,B) by a second induction on u = |U |,
where i ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B. If u = 1, i.e. U = {i}, since f1 and f2 satisfy lgp, we have
f1i (N, v,B) = f
1
[U ]([B1], v
1, B1) = f
2
[U ]([B1], v
1, B1) = f
2
i (N, v,B),
where the second equality holds by the ﬁrst induction hypothesis. Hence, suppose that
f1l (N, v,B) = f
2
l (N, v,B) for any (N, v,B) ∈ GL, with |B| = k + 1 and any l ∈ U ∈ B1
that satisﬁes |U | ≤ u. Now suppose that |U | = u+ 1 and let j ∈ U \ i. Since f1 and f2
satisfy lbc, we have
f1i (N, v,B)− f1j (N, v,B) = f1i (N, v,B−j)− f1j (N, v,B−i)
= f2i (N, v,B
−j)− f2j (N, v,B−i) = f2i (N, v,B)− f2j (N, v,B), (3)
where the second equality follows from the second induction hypothesis, since i ∈ U \j ∈
B−j1 and j ∈ U \ i ∈ B−i1 with |U \ j| = |U \ i| = u, where |B−j | = |B−i| = k + 1. Now,
adding up eq. (3) for each j ∈ U \ i, we have
(u+ 1)f1i (N, v,B)−
∑
j∈U
f1j (N, v,B) = (u+ 1)f
2
i (N, v,B)−
∑
j∈U
f2j (N, v,B). (4)
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Finally, since f1 and f2 satisfy lgp, we have that
∑
j∈U
f1j (N, v,B) = f
1
[U ]([B1], v
r, B1) = f
2
[U ]([B1], v
r, B1) =
∑
j∈U
f2j (N, v,B), (5)
where the second equality holds by the ﬁrst induction hypothesis since |B1| = k. Com-
bining eq. (4) and (5) we obtain f1i (N, v,B) = f
2
i (N, v,B), which completes the proof.

In the next theorem we characterize the Banzhaf levels value with a set of six proper-
ties, four properties that characterize the Banzhaf value, ψ, and two additional properties
that describe the way in which the Banzhaf levels value, Ψ, deals with the levels struc-
ture of cooperation. Recall that the last two properties are logically related to those
used to characterize the Shapley levels value.
Theorem 4.2. The Banzhaf levels value, Ψ, is the unique value on GL satisfying 2-eff,
dpp, sym, emc, slgp, and lnid.
Proof. As in the previous theorem, we ﬁrst show that Ψ satisﬁes the properties and
then we prove that it is the only value satisfying them.
(1) Existence. Note that, by deﬁnition, for every (N, v) ∈ G, Ψ(N, v, {B0}) =
ψ(N, v). Hence, from , 0) we have that Ψ satisﬁes 2-eff, dpp, sym, and emc.
In the case of slgp, the proof follows immediately taking into account the fact
that, for any (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk} and U = {i} ∈ Br for some
r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, P (i, B) = P ([U ], Br).
In the case of lnid, we only need to check that for any (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B =
{B0, . . . , Bk}, and any i, j ∈ U ∈ B1, P (i, B) = P (i, B−j), which follows from the
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deﬁnition of the partition induced by B.
(2) Uniqueness. From the characterization in , 0), we have that any value on GL that
satisﬁes 2-eff, dpp, sym, and emc is unique for games with the trivial levels structure
of cooperation. In other words, let f1 and f2 be two values on GL satisfying 2-eff, dpp,
sym, and emc, then
f1(N, v, {B0}) = f2(N, v, {B0}) = ψ(N, v) , for any (N, v) ∈ G.
Now let f1 and f2 be two values on GL satisfying slgp and lnid such that f1(N, v, {B0}) =
f2(N, v, {B0}) for all (N, v) ∈ G. We prove that for any (N, v,B) ∈ GL, with B =
{B0, . . . , Bk}, f1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) by induction on the number k of levels of B.
The case k = 1 is proved in . Hence suppose that f1(N, v,B) = f2(N, v,B) for any
(N, v,B) ∈ GL such that |B| ≤ k and let (N, v,B) ∈ GL such that |B| = k + 1. Let
i ∈ U ∈ B1 be an arbitrary player that belongs to an arbitrary union of the ﬁrst level.
We prove that f1i (N, v,B) = f
2
i (N, v,B) by a second induction on u = |U |. If u = 1,
i.e. U = {i}, since f1 and f2 satisfy slgp, we have
f1i (N, v,B) = f
1
[U ]([B1], v
1, B1) = f
2
[U ]([B1], v
1, B1) = f
2
i (N, v,B),
where the second equality holds by the ﬁrst induction hypothesis since ([B1], B1) is a
levels structure with k levels. Now suppose that f1l (N, v,B) = f
2
l (N, v,B) for any
(N, v,B) such that |B| = k + 1 and any l ∈ U ∈ B1 where |U | ≤ u. Next, suppose that
|U | = u+ 1 and let j ∈ U \ i. Since f1 and f2 satisfy lnid, we have
f1i (N, v,B) = f
1
i (N, v,B
−j) = f2i (N, v,B
−j) = f2i (N, v,B),
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where the second equality holds by the second induction hypothesis since i ∈ U \ j ∈
B−j1 ∈ B−j , B−j has k + 1 levels of cooperation, and |U \ j| = u, which concludes the
proof. 
Finally, we check that the proposed properties are independent axioms, and hence we
cannot drop any of them from the characterizations. We start examining the properties
used for the characterization of the Shapley levels value, Φ.
Remark 4.3. Independence of properties for Theorem 4.1
(i) The value on GL, g, given by g(N, v,B) = 0 for all (N, v,B) ∈ GL satisﬁes sym,
emc, lgp, lbc but not eff.
(ii) Let g be the value on GL deﬁned as follows:
• If N = {i, j} and B = {{i}, {j}},
gi(N, v,B) =
3
4
(v(N)− v(j)) + 1
4
v(i) and
gj(N, v,B) =
1
4
(v(N)− v(i)) + 3
4
v(j).
• Otherwise, g(N, v,B) = Φ(N, v,B).
Thus, g satisﬁes eff, emc, lgp, lbc, but not sym.
(iii) Consider the value on GL, g, given by
g(N, v,B) =

Φ(N, v,B) if (N, v,B) /∈ C
ai(N,v)1i(N,v) if (N, v,B) ∈ C
where
C = {(N, v,B) ∈ GL : v = biτi + (ai − bi)δN , for some i = i(N, v) ∈ N and 0 ≤ bi < ai}
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such that, for every S ⊆ N , and 1k ∈ Rn is such that 1k(l) = 1 if k = l and 1k(l) =
τi(S) =

1 if i ∈ S
0 otherwise
and δN (S) =

1 if S = N
0 otherwise
,
0 if k 6= l. Then g satisﬁes eff, sym, lgp, lbc, but not emc.
(iv) The value on GL, g, given by g(N, v,B) = φ(N, v) for all (N, v,B) ∈ GL satisﬁes
eff, sym, emc, lbc, but not lgp.
(v) Let g be the value on GL deﬁned as follows:
• If N = {i, j} and B = {{{i}, {j}}, N}, g(N, v,B) = (v(N)2 , v(N)2 ).
• Otherwise, g(N, v,B) = Φ(N, v,B).
Thus, g satisﬁes eff, sym, emc, lgp but not lbc.
Lastly, we examine the properties used for the characterization of the Banzhaf levels
value, Ψ.
Remark 4.4. Independence of axioms for Theorem 4.2
(i) The value on GL, g, given by
gi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
|R|!(mi − |R| − 1)!
mi!
(v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)) ,
satisﬁes dpp, sym, emc, slgp, lnid but not 2-eff.
(ii) The value on GL, g, given by g(N, v,B) = 0 for all (N, v,B) ∈ GL satisﬁes 2-eff,
sym, emc, slgp, lnid, but not dpp.
(iii) Let g be the value on GL deﬁned as follows:
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• If N = {i, j} and B = {{i}, {j}},
gi(N, v,B) =
3
4
(v(N)− v(j)) + 1
4
v(i) and
gj(N, v,B) =
1
4
(v(N)− v(i)) + 3
4
v(j).
• Otherwise, g(N, v,B) = Ψ(N, v,B).
Thus, g satisﬁes 2-eff, dpp, emc, slgp, lnid, but not sym.
(iv) The value on GL, g, given by
g(N, v,B) =

Ψ(N, v,B) if (N, v,B) /∈ C
0 if (N, v,B) ∈ C
where C = {(N, v,B) ∈ GL : v = aSδS , for some S ⊆ N}, satisﬁes 2-eff, dpp, sym,
slgp, lnid, but not emc.
(v) The value on GL, g, given by g(N, v,B) = ψ(N, v) for all (N, v,B) ∈ GL satisﬁes
2-eff, dpp, sym, emc, lnid, but not slgp.
(vi) The value on GL, g, given by
gi(N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
1
2mi−|TR∩Uk|
· |TR ∩ Uk|!(|Uk \ TR| − 1)!|Uk|! (v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)) ,
satisﬁes 2-eff, dpp, sym, emc, slgp, but not lnid, where recall that Uk is the union
of the k-th level to which player i belongs.
5 Conclusions
In the present paper we have proposed a new value for games with levels structure of
cooperation and we have provided characterizations of this new value, the Banzhaf levels
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value, and the Shapley levels value. It should be pointed out that, in both theorems,
the group of properties that apply only for the trivial levels structure can be replaced
by any other group of properties that characterize either the Shapley or the Banzhaf
value. The remaining properties, lgp and lbc in Theorem 4.1 and slgp and lnid in
Theorem 4.2, describe the behavior of the solutions with respect to the levels structure
of cooperation. Moreover, since these latter properties are logically comparable, our
paper serves in the purpose of deciding which value to use in a particular framework of
restricted cooperation given by a sequence of union levels.
6 Appendix
Proof of the claim in the Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Let (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk}, i, j ∈ U1 ⊆ ... ⊆ Uk with Ur ∈ Br for
each r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, and R ⊆Mij . Let us deﬁne, for r ∈ {1, · · · , k},
λrR = |{σ ∈ Ωr(B) : P σi = TR}|+ |{σ ∈ Ωr(B) : P σi = TR ∪ j}| , and
λ−rR = |{σ ∈ Ωr(B−j) : P σi = TR}|+ |{σ ∈ Ωr(B−j) : P σi = TR ∪ j}|.
Observe that λ1R = c
i
R + c
i
R+j and λ
−1
R = c
i,−j
R + c
i.−j
R+j . We prove that
λrR
|Ωr(B)| =
λ−rR
|Ωr(B−j)|
for all r ∈ {1, · · · , k} by backward induction on r. For each r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, let br = |Br|,
ur = |Ur|, Ar = |{U ∈ Br \ Ur : U ⊆ Ur+1 and U ∩ TR = ∅}|, and Br = |{U ∈
Br \Ur : U ⊆ Ur+1 and U ⊆ TR}|. Recall that by convenience Uk+1 = N . Observe that
Ak +Bk + 1 = bk and that, for each r ∈ {1, · · · , k}, |Ur ∩ TR|+ |Ur \ TR| = ur.
We start proving the case r = k. Recall that Uk ∈ Bk is such that i, j ∈ Uk. In
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particular, i, j ∈ Uk \ TR and thus |Uk \ TR| ≥ 2. By deﬁnition of λrR,
λkR =
∏
S∈Bk\Uk
|S|! ·Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 1)!
+
∏
S∈Bk\Uk
|S|! ·Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|+ 1)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)!
=
∏
S∈Bk\Uk
|S|! ·Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)! · uk.
Similarly, by deﬁnition of λ−kR ,
λ−kR =
∏
S∈Bk\Uk
|S|! · (Ak + 1)! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)!
+
∏
S∈Bk\Uk
|S|! ·Ak! · (Bk + 1)! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)!
=
∏
S∈Bk\Uk
|S|! ·Ak! ·Bk! · (|Uk ∩ TR|)! · (|Uk \ TR| − 2)! · (bk + 1).
Hence, for every R ⊆ Mij , λ
k
R
λ−kR
= ukbk+1 . To conclude with the ﬁrst step of the
induction one can easily check that Ωk(B)
Ωk(B−j)
= ukbk+1 .
Now suppose that for every R ⊆ Mij , |Ωr+1(B)||Ωr+1(B−j)| =
λr+1R
λ−,r+1R
, for some r ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
By deﬁnition of λkR,
λrR
λr+1R
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1
h(S)!|S|! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!
 ·Ar! ·Br! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆Ur+1\Ur
|S′|!
· (|Ur ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 1)! + (|Ur ∩ TR|+ 1)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 1)!
(|Ur+1 ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 1)! + (|Ur+1 ∩ TR|+ 1)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 2)!
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1
h(S)!|S|! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!
 ·Ar! ·Br! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆Ur+1\Ur
|S′|!
· (|Ur ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 2)!
(|Ur+1 ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 2)! ·
ur+1
ur
,
24
where h(S) = | {S′ ∈ Br : S′ ⊆ S} | for each S ∈ Br+1. Similarly, by deﬁnition of λ−kR ,
λ−,rR
λ−,r+1R
=
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1
h(S)!|S|! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!
 ·Ar! ·Br! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆Ur+1\Ur
|S′|!
· (|Ur ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur \ TR| − 2)!
(|Ur+1 ∩ TR|)! · (|Ur+1 \ TR| − 2)! .
Combining the two above expressions we obtain
λrR
λ−,rR
=
λr+1R
λ−,r+1R
· ur
ur+1
. (6)
Furthermore,
|Ωr(B)|
|Ωr+1(B)| =
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1
h(S)!|S|! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!
 · h(Ur+1)!ur+1! ·
 ∏
S′∈Br\Ur
S′⊆Ur+1
|S′|!
 · ur!,
and
|Ωr(B−j)|
|Ωr+1(B−j)| =
∏
S∈Br+1\Ur+1
h(S)!|S|! · ∏
S′∈Br
S′⊆S
|S′|!
· h(Ur+1)!(ur+1 − 1)! ·
 ∏
S′∈Br\Ur
S′⊆Ur+1
|S′|!
·(ur−1)!.
Thus
|Ωr(B)|
|Ωr(B−j)| =
|Ωr+1(B)|
|Ωr+1(B−j)| ·
ur
ur+1
. (7)
Hence, from eq. (6) and (7), using the induction hypothesis we obtain
λrR
|Ωr(B)| =
λ−,rR
|Ωr(B−j)| ,
which concludes the proof. 
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